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1 In relation to Ethiopian trials, the expression ‘core crimes’ is used in this article to refer to 
genocide and war crimes only. Crimes against humanity and aggression are not listed as 
criminal offences in Ethiopian law.
Punishing Core Crimes in Ethiopia: Analysis of the 
Domestic Practice in Light of and in Comparison, 
with Sentencing Practices at the unicts and the icc
Tadesse Simie Metekia
Law Faculty, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands 
t.s.metekia@rug.nl
Abstract
Between 1992 and 2010, Ethiopian courts prosecuted over five thousand people for the 
core crimes of genocide and war crimes perpetrated in Ethiopia since 1974. The vast 
majority of the defendants were convicted and sentenced to a range of penalties ap-
plicable under Ethiopian law. This article examines the manner in which Ethiopian 
courts have punished core crimes. It analyses the domestic law and practice in light of 
and in comparison with the sentencing practice in the unicts and the icc. The article 
also discusses whether Ethiopian law and practice have treated the punishment of 
core crimes differently than the punishment of domestic crimes.
Keywords
core crimes – death penalty – discretion – double counting – initial penalty – mass 
trials – retribution – special aggravating and mitigating factors
1 Introduction
Ethiopia is not new to prosecuting and punishing core crimes.1 The Dergue 
trials (1992–2010), known colloquially as the Red-Terror trials, denote the first 
instance of prosecution of core crimes (political genocide and war crimes) in 
Downloaded from Brill.com11/19/2019 03:41:44PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
 161Punishing Core Crimes in Ethiopia







2 Proclamation Establishing the Office of the Special Prosecutor: No. 22/1991, entered into force 
8 August 1992, Articles 1 and 6. For a detailed historical context, see Teferra Haile-Selassie, The 
Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1991: From a Monarchical Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy (Rout-
ledge, London, 1997) 147–295.
3 See Federal Prosecutor v. Gure Uchala et al., fhc, File No. 31855.
4 Federal Prosecutor v. Hailu Shawul et al., fhc, File No. 43246/97.
5 See Prosecutor v. Tadesse Jewannie et al., fhc, File No. 70996.
6 See section 2 infra.
Ethiopia as well as in Africa. These trials commenced after the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia (1991–1995) had established in 1992 the Special Pros-
ecutor’s Office (spo) to prosecute mass atrocities perpetrated during the 
Dergue regime (1974–1991) due to violent political skirmishes and protracted 
civil wars.2
Besides the Dergue trials, Ethiopia prosecuted core crimes in: (i) the Anuak-
Nuwer trials (2004–2005), (ii) the cud trials (2005–2008), and (iii) the Oromo-
Gumuz trials (2008–2010). The Anuak-Nuwer trials dealt with the prosecution 
of the genocidal killing of 32 South-Sudanese refugees identified as members 
of the Nuwer ethnic group by the perpetrators, security forces belonging to the 
Anuak ethnic group.3 In the cud trials, members of an opposition coalition 
named Coalition for Unity and Democracy were prosecuted for an attempted 
genocide in relation to post-election conflict that erupted in the country in 
early 2005.4 The Oromo-Gumuz trials prosecuted individuals for a genocide 
committed in the context of an inter-ethnic conflict that took place in western 
Ethiopia in May 2008 between members of the Oromo and the Gumuz ethnic 
groups.5
Ethiopian courts have imposed various kinds of penalties on thousands 
of individuals found guilty of perpetrating core crimes.6 This article analyses 
the manner in which these trials have punished core crimes. It examines the 
Ethiopian law and practice on sentencing in light of and in comparison with 
that of the unicts (the icty and ictr) and the icc. In this respect, the justi-
fication for comparing the domestic and the international systems rests on the 
fact that both systems have functional equivalence in prosecuting and pun-
ishing core crimes. To provide for a comprehensive analysis of the Ethiopian 
practice, the article juxtaposes, when relevant, the punishment of core crimes 
with that of domestic crimes.
Accordingly, section 2 provides an overview of convictions and sentences 
imposed in the Ethiopian core crimes trials. Section  3 discusses the appli-
cable laws and penalties. Section 4 focuses on sentencing rationales invoked 
in Ethiopian trials of core crimes and compares and contrasts them with the 
Downloaded from Brill.com11/19/2019 03:41:44PM
via Universiteit of Groningen
Metekia










7 See Federal Prosecutor v. Aliyu Yesufe et al., fhc (Indictment of 3 September 2008), File 
No. 71000; pp. 1–8; Tadesse Jewannie et al. (Indictment of 3 September 2008), pp. 1–9; Fed-
eral Prosecutor v. Tesfaye Neno Loya et al., fhc (Indictment of 20 September 2008), File 
No. 74796 pp. 1–4.
8 See Gure Uchala et al. (Indictment of 2 February 2004), pp. 1–2.
9 See Hailu Shawul et al. (Judgment of 30 March 2007), p. 5; Federal Prosecutor v. Berehene 
Kehassaye et al., fhc (Judgment of 19 April 2007) File No. 45671/98, p. 7; Federal Prosecutor 
v. Kifle Tigeneh et al., fhc (Ruling of 16 April 2007) File No. 44562, p. 23.
10 See Gure Uchala et al. (Sentencing Judgment of 30 March 2005), pp. 1–3.
11 Aliyu Yesufe et al. (Sentencing Judgment of 5 Septembre 2009), pp. 1–6; Tadesse Jewannie 
et al. (Sentencing Judgment of 2 September 2009), pp. 1–4; Tesfaye Neno et al. (Sentencing 
Judgment of 20 May 2009), pp. 1–3.
12 ‘Dem Yazele Dossie’ (Special Prosecutor’s Office, Final Report, 2010), p. 464.
13 Rigorous imprisonment is defined in section 3.2.1. below.
purposes of punishment in the international arena. Section 5 makes a compar-
ative analysis of the rules governing mitigation and aggravation of sentences. 
Section 6 discusses the issue of individualization of sentences and the totality 
principle in mass trial cases. Section 7 concludes the article by pointing out the 
significant aspects of the comparison.
2 Overview of the Convictions and Sentences Imposed
The above-mentioned four trials have prosecuted 5492 suspects for core crimes. 
In the Dergue trials, the spo indicted 5119 individuals. The Oromo-Gumuz trials 
prosecuted 276 defendants7 while the Anuak-Nuwer trials brought only 9 per-
sons to justice.8 In the cud trials, 88 individuals stood trial, all of whom were 
acquitted of genocide-related charges by the Federal High Court (fhc), which 
entered a conviction for treason instead.9
The Anuak-Nuwer trials found 3 of the 9 defendants guilty.10 In the Oromo-
Gumuz trials, 174 of 276 suspects were convicted.11 The Dergue trials entered a 
guilty verdict for 3583 of the 5119 defendants.12 On average, the conviction rate 
of the three trials stands at 69.5 percent, which means that 3760 of the 5404 
suspects were convicted and punished.
As abridged in the following table, the penalty imposed on perpetrators of 
core crimes varies between 2 years of rigorous imprisonment13 to punishment 
by death. In the Dergue trials, 52 death sentences, 182 life sentences, and 921 
sentences of rigorous imprisonment from 15 to 25 years were imposed. In the 
Oromo-Gumuz trials, the fhc sentenced 7 individuals to death, 8 individuals to 
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14 The Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation 
No. 414/2004 entered into force 9 May 2005 [fdre Criminal Code], Articles 121–128.
15 Ibid., Article 123.
16 See for instance, spo v. Gebremedehene Berga et al., fhc (Sentencing Judgment of 11 April 
2001) File no. 646/89, p. 7.
17 See fdre Criminal Code, Book ii, Chapter ii.
life in prison, and 95 individuals to rigorous imprisonment from 15 to 25 years. 
The Anuak-Nuwer trials punished génocidaires with the maximum of 14 years 
of rigorous imprisonment (see Table 1).
3 Applicable Penalties for Core Crimes under Ethiopian Law
Ethiopian criminal law (both the 1957 Penal Code and the 2005 Criminal Code) 
divides penalties into two categories: principal and secondary. The former is 
further divided into three: 1. compulsory labour; 2. pecuniary penalties; and 
3. penalties entailing loss of liberty. The latter includes temporary or perma-
nent deprivation of rights and dismissal from the defense forces.14 Secondary 
 penalties may be imposed in addition to the principal penalties when deemed 
beneficial to the reform of the criminal and society at large.15 Unlike their inter-
national counterparts, Ethiopians found guilty of crimes were often deprived 
of certain rights in addition to the principal core penalties. This included bar-
ring an ex-police officer from resuming professional work as a detective for a 
certain number of years after serving a prison term for unlawful detention and 
torture (see Table 2).16
3.1 Pecuniary Penalties
In relation to pecuniary penalties (fines and confiscation of property),17 a sig-
nificant point of departure between Ethiopian law and the laws of the icc 
Table 1 Summary of sentences imposed
Trials Sentences imposed
Death Life 15−25 years <15 years Minimum Sentence
Dergue 52 182 921 2028 2 years
Anuak-Nuwer – – – 3 13 years
Oromo-Gumuz 7 8 95 66 5 years
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18 Exceptionally, when justified by ‘the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual cir-
cumstances of the convicted person’. See icc Statute, Article 77(1)(b).
19 icc Statute, Article 77(2)(b).
20 ictr Statute, Article 23(3); icty Statute, Article 24(3).
21 See for details, Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005) p. 358.
22 See in this regard, Worku Fekadu and Shume Ararsso v. Prosecutor for Benishangul-Gumuz 
Regional State, fsc Cassation Bench (Decision of 25 January 2013), File No. 75387, pp. 2–3.
23 See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ictr (Judgment and Sentence of 4 September 1998), Case 
No. ictr 97–23-s, para. 10.
and the unicts concerns the confiscation and return of property acquired, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of a crime. This penalty is pro-
vided both in the Statute of the icc19 and in those of the unicts,20 although 
in the case of the latter it has not been applied, even when circumstances de-
manded it.21 Ethiopian law does not allow the applicability of this penalty for 
core crimes. As a result, and apparently owing to the application of the prin-
ciple nulla poena sine lege, Ethiopian courts have refrained from entertaining 
the issue of confiscation and return of property despite the existence of proof 
that perpetrators had indeed acquired the property of their victims.22
In contrast to the Statutes of the ictr and icty, which exclude fines as 
a form of punishment,23 Ethiopian law allows for the imposition of fines, 
Table 2 Penalties applicable to core crimes: Ethiopian law vis-à-vis the Statutes of the icc 
and unicts
Penalty Ethiopian law icc ictr icty
Death √ X X X
Life √ √18 √ √
Prison terms 5–25 years 30 years maximum no limit no limit
Fine If committed with 









X √ √ √
Secondary 
penalties
√ X X X
X: Not applicable √: Applicable
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24 icc Statute, Article 77(2)(a); icc Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 146. See also 
 Rebecca Young, ‘Fines and Forfeiture in International Criminal Justice’, in Róisín Mulgrew 
and Denis Abels (eds.), Research Handbook on the International Penal System (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2016) pp. 109–111.
25 See fdre Criminal Code, Article 92 (2).
26 This happens when the defendant, who cannot produce sureties and securities, has no 
property that can be seized and sold or is unwilling to perform some work for the state. 
See fdre Criminal Code, Articles 93–96.
27 icc Rules of Procedures and Evidence, Rule 46(5).
28 See Tadesse Jewannie et al., supra note 11, pp. 6–7; Tesfaye Neno et al. (Judgment of 30 April 
2009), p. 4.
29 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Trial Chamber ii (Sentencing Judgment of 23 May 2014), 
cc-01/04–01/07–3484, para. 169.
30 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber i (sentencing Judgment of 10 July 
2012) icc01/04–01/06–2901, para. 106.
in addition to imprisonment, in a manner that is more or less similar to 
the icc Statute.24 It is the commission of a crime with a motive of gain, ir-
respective of whether the gain is an essential element of the crime, that ex-
ceptionally justifies the imposition of fines under Ethiopian law.25 Both the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code and the icc Statute provide for mandatory payment 
of fines. In case of default, Ethiopian courts may as a last resort pronounce 
that the convicted person performs compulsory labour for the State for a 
maximum of two years26 while the icc can extend prison terms by up to five 
years.27
Nonetheless, none of the Ethiopian core crimes trials have imposed fines, 
even when the existence of a motive of gain was pointed out to be the reason 
behind the commission of genocide. For instance, in the Oromo-Gumuz trials, 
the motive behind the genocidal act of the Gumuz against the Oromo farmers 
living along the borders of the two regional states was to acquire disputed land 
occupied by the farmers.28 Not only did the court fail to consider imposing 
fines in these cases, but it also did not apply the existence of the motive of gain 
as an aggravating factor, which would have been possible under Article 86 of 
the Criminal Code. This Ethiopian practice is in stark contrast with the prac-
tice of the icc, which has considered the imposition of fines in its sentencing 
decisions in Katanga,29 and in Lubanga,30 although it actually imposed no fine 
in both cases due to, respectively, the defendant’s impecuniousness and ab-
sence of evidence of any assets.
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31 fdre Criminal Code, Article 108.
32 William Schabas, ‘International Law and the Abolition of Death Penalty’, 55(3) Washing-
ton and Lee Law Review (1998) 798–799.
33 The Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, Proclamation No. 158/1957, Extraordi-
nary Issue No. 1, of 1957 of the Negarit Gazeta, 23 July 1957, entered into force 5 May 1958 
[1957 Penal Code], Article 281; fdre Criminal Code, Article 269.
34 These are: war crimes against a civilian population, war crimes against wounded sick 
or shipwrecked persons or medical services, war crimes against prisoners and interned 
persons, pillage, piracy and looting, dereliction of duty towards the enemy, use of illegal 
means of combat, and franc-tireurs. See 1957 Penal Code, Articles 270, 271, 273, 275, 277, 
and 278.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., Art. 274.
37 See 1957 Penal Code of Ethiopia, Article 107; fdre Criminal Code, Article 108. The Amharic 
version reads ‘ ከባድ ወንጀል’/grave crimes/ while the English versions of both codes use a 
different expression, namely ‘offences of a very grave nature’.
38 See ibid., Article 106.
3.2 Penalties Entailing Loss of Liberty
As for penalties that entail temporary or permanent loss of liberty, which are 
the primary forms of punishment applicable to core crimes, Ethiopian law 
authorises the imposition of prison terms which range from 10 days to life in 
prison.31 It also prescribes a penalty that has been abolished from the interna-
tional arena, the death penalty.32 Genocide is punishable with a minimum of 
5 years of rigorous imprisonment.33 This minimum penalty is prescribed for 
7 of the 13 war crimes proscribed in Ethiopian law.34 The maximum sentence 
a court can impose for both categories of core crime is the death sentence.35 
Inchoate crimes such as conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide or war 
crimes are punishable with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years.36 
The following section provides a separate discussion of penalties entailing loss 
of liberty with a particular focus on their applicability to core crimes.
3.2.1 Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 to 25 Years
Rigorous imprisonment applies to grave crimes committed by criminals who 
are particularly dangerous to society.37 This type of imprisonment ranges from 
a period of one year to life, and is accompanied by more severe conditions 
of imprisonment, as compared to simple imprisonment.38 Although there is 
no guidance in the law as to what sort of conditions are to be considered se-
vere enough for this purpose, the conditions of imprisonment must always 
respect the human dignity of the prisoner and comply with international 
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39 See the fdre Constitution, Articles 13(2) and 21(2). Nonetheless, prison observation re-
ports indicate the existence in Ethiopia of treatment in violation of international human 
rights law. See for instance, un Committee Against Torture (cat), Concluding observations 
of the Committee against Torture: Ethiopia, 20 January 2011, cat/c/eth/co/1, paras. 10, 26, 
29, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6cca412.html, accessed 20 July 2018.
40 Draft Criminal Code of Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, September 1989, Article 
281.
41 See fdre Criminal Code, Articles 240–241, 249, 407–408, 411, 413–415, 512, 573, 596, 690.
42 Ibid., Article 241.
43 See Federal Prosecutor v. Waltajji Begalo et al., fhc (Judgment of 26 February 2015) File No. 
136639, p. 22.
44 See fdre Criminal Code, Articles 269(1) and 270(1).
45 Ibid., Article 439.
human rights law — a Constitutional promise that practice often fails to 
uphold.39
The 5 years of rigorous imprisonment prescribed as a minimum penalty for 
genocide and the above-mentioned categories of war crimes has not always 
been seen as proportionate to the gravity of these crimes. For instance, an at-
tempt was made in a Draft Criminal Code completed in 1989 to increase it to 10 
years of rigorous imprisonment.40 This has never materialized. Besides, several 
other offences which were punishable with a minimum penalty of 5 years un-
der the Penal Code now carry a more severe minimum penalty, that is, 10 years 
of rigorous imprisonment.41
The Criminal Code’s failure to apply the same minimum penalty for core 
crimes has resulted in the application of an absurd penalty scheme. To eluci-
date this, one needs to look at the crime of attack on the political or territorial 
integrity of the State, a crime punishable with a minimum of 10 years of im-
prisonment.42 This crime, as interpreted in Federal Prosecutor v. Waltajji Begalo 
et al., comprises acts constituting a forcible transfer of people from one regional 
state to the other.43 The exact same acts are regarded as underlying offences of 
genocide or war crimes.44 Consequently, these acts are punishable more leni-
ently (with 5 years of rigorous imprisonment) when perpetrated with an ulte-
rior intent, that is, when committed with intent to destroy a protected group in 
case of genocide or with a nexus to an armed conflict in the case of war crimes.
A similar contradiction exists when the offence of aggravated homicide is 
involved, which carries a minimum sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life.45 
Paradoxically, when an aggravated homicide is committed as an underlying 
offence to genocide or war crimes the penalty could be as lenient as 5 years of 
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46 spo v. Aman Gobena et al., Oromia Supreme Court (Sentencing Judgment of 23 April 
2002), File No. 8/92, pp. 7–9; spo v. Abdulekadir Mohammed Burka, fhc (Sentencing 
 Judgment of 13 July 2004) File No. 17011, p. 4.
47 Ibid.
48 See for instance, spo v. Negash Woldemichael et al., fhc (Sentencing Judgment of 17 
November 2006), File No. 03114, pp. 4–6; spo v. Seleshi Mekuria et al., fhc (Sentencing 
Judgment of 8 November 2000), File No. 959/89, pp. 1–3.
49 See infra section 4.2.1.
50 fdre Criminal Code, Article 108.
51 icc Statute, Article 77.
52 See Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko et al. (Appeal Judgement of 14 December 2015), 
ictr-98–42-a, para. 3523; Prosecutor v. Krstić (Judgment of 2 August 2001) it-98–33, para. 
726. The Appeals Chamber had in fact reduced Krstić’s punishment to 35 years of impris-
onment. See Prosecutor v. Krstić (Appeal Judgment of 19 April 2004) Case No. it-98–33-a, 
paras. 5–38.
rigorous imprisonment. As was also seen in Aman Gobena et al. and  Abdulekadir 
Mohammed Burka, which dealt with aggravated homicide as a purely domestic 
crime, the absurdity of the sentencing scheme is profound.46 In both cases, the 
courts have taken the life sentence as the minimum penalty applicable, which 
they then aggravated into the death sentence.47 In contrast, in several cases 
involving genocide and war crimes through the commission of aggravated ho-
micide, the lower reference point for punishment was 5 years of rigorous im-
prisonment, which took several levels and grounds of aggravation for a convict 
to be sentenced to life imprisonment, let alone to death.48
It should be pointed out here that the 5 years of imprisonment that the core 
crimes carry is not the absolute minimum. Courts may, pursuant to Article 180 
of the Criminal Code, freely mitigate it to a prison term of as low as 1 year of 
rigorous imprisonment.49 Nonetheless, the maximum prison term of 25 years 
that the core crimes carry is the absolute maximum, which judges are not al-
lowed to exceed no matter what the case may be.50 As such, as far as a fixed 
prison term is concerned, core crimes are punishable in Ethiopia with a lower 
penalty than what the icc Statute permits as the maximum, namely 30 years 
of imprisonment.51 Similarly, the ictr and the icty (where prison terms for 
specified years could, in principle, be unlimited) have punished perpetrators 
of core crimes, in several cases, with a fixed prison term that is way more than 
the maximum allowed in Ethiopia. In Nyiramasuhuko et al. and Krstić, the 
 tribunals have imposed their longest prison terms to date, that is, respectively, 
47 and 46 years of imprisonment.52
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53 See icc Statute, Article 77(1)(B); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, icty and ictr, Rule 
101(A). To date, the icty has imposed 6 life sentences. See http://www.icty.org/en/cases/
judgement-list, accessed 30 August 2018.
54 Penal Code of Ethiopia, entered into force September 1930, Articles 161–190.
55 Gauthier de Beco, ‘Life Sentences and Human Dignity’, 9(3) The International Journal of 
Human Rights (2005) 414.
56 icc Statute, Article 110(3).
57 See Kafkaris v. Cyprus, echr (Judgment of 12 February 2008) Application no. 21906/04, 
paras. 97–108; Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, echr (Grand Chamber Judgment 
of 9 July 2013) Applications nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, paras. 119–122.
58 fdre Criminal Code, Preface, p. iv.
59 icc Statute, Article 110(3).
3.2.2 Life Imprisonment
A life sentence, the ultimate penalty in the international system,53 has always 
been one of the applicable penalties in Ethiopia since the enactment of the 
country’s first penal code in 1930.54 Currently, about 45 offences in the 2005 
Criminal Code are punishable by life sentence. This includes genocide and the 
7 war crimes mentioned above.
A life sentence in Ethiopia has a unique position in the sense that the law 
avoids any possible confusion between life sentence and fixed prison terms on 
the one hand and between a life sentence and the death penalty on the other. 
By limiting the maximum prison term to twenty-five years even in cases of 
concurrent crimes, the law avoids the addition of sentences to impose a prison 
term that may be tantamount to life in prison or even go beyond, a problem 
witnessed in the case of un icts, as discussed below.
Life imprisonment under Ethiopian law does not amount, in reality, to what 
some referred to as ‘putting an individual in a waiting room until [her or his] 
death’.55 Similar to the Rome Statute of the icc that provides for life impris-
onment with the possibility of parole,56 Ethiopian law is compatible with the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts which considers irreducible life 
sentences as inhuman and degrading treatment.57 According to the Criminal 
Code, the adoption of life imprisonment without depriving convicts of any 
hope of release indicates the major place it ‘has allocated for the rehabilitation 
of offenders’.58
Under Article 202 of the Criminal Code, a lifer is eligible for conditional re-
lease upon serving 20 years of the sentence. This eligibility criterion is set at 25 
years by the Rome Statute.59 The law at the ictr and the icty has undergone 
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60 See Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (Reasons for the President’s Decision to Deny the Early 
Release of Stanislav Galić and Decision on Prosecution Motion of 23 June 2015), mict-
14–83-es, public redacted version, paras. 35 and 36.
61 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (Reasons for the President’s Decision to Deny the Early Re-
lease of Stanislav Galić of 18 January 2017), mict-14–83-es, public redacted version, para. 
21.
62 fdre Criminal Code, Articles, 204, 205, 208.
63 Ibid., Article 202(2).
64 Ibid., Article 188.
65 See Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Trial Chamber viii (Judgment and sentence of 
27 September 2016) icc-01–12–01/15, para. 96.
66 The President is the head of the State with nominal and ceremonial powers, unlike the 
Prime Minister who is the head of the government with actual powers including chief 
executive and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
67 fdre Criminal Code, Article 117(2).
an evolution. Up until the Galić early release decision in 2015, it was the law 
of the State in which the convicted person was imprisoned that determined 
the lifer’s eligibility for early release, a reality that raised a concern regarding 
the equal treatment of similarly-situated convicts. Since Galić, a sentence of life 
imprisonment has been considered as equivalent to a hypothetical sentence of 
at least 45 years, and a lifer may be released upon having served two-thirds of 
a life sentence, which is ‘more than 30 years’.60 For the sake of consistency, this 
criterion remained intact despite the jurisprudential change introduced by the 
Nyiramasahuko appeal judgment, which, on 14 December 2015, reduced a life 
sentence to 47 years.61
Upon granting early release, an Ethiopian court may require the prisoner to 
undergo a period of probation of five to seven years.62 However, a persistent 
recidivist,63 that is a person who repeats the commission of a crime more than 
once, is not eligible for early release.64 This exception is, perhaps, not relevant 
to core crimes, in relation to which recidivism appears to be not common, as 
highlighted in the jurisprudence of the unicts as well as in the sentencing 
decision of the icc in Al Mahdi.65
3.2.3 The Death Penalty
The death penalty has a basis in the Ethiopian Constitution and can be carried 
out as long as the President66 approves it by denying amnesty or pardon.67 
Nonetheless, executions are not as frequent as the number of death sentences 
imposed. As stated in a study conducted in 2013, only three reported executions 
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68 A. Kesito, ‘Death Penalty in Ethiopia’ (September 2013, Adama) (unpublished), pp. 20–25.
69 It was the assassination of Hayelom Araya, a Major General, and Kinfe Gebre-Medehin, 
the country’s head of intelligence and security services that justified, respectively, the first 
and second executions. In the third case, three individuals were executed for killing two 
members of the Ethiopian security forces that intervened in a shootout to avert the assas-
sination attempt carried out in 1995 against Hosni Mubarak, the then Egyptian President, 
in Addis Ababa. See ibid.
70 Amnesty International, ‘Death Sentences and Executions in 2013’, 26 March 2014, 43, avail-
able at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/act500012014en.pdf, accessed: 15 
August 2018.
71 fdre Criminal Code, Article 119.
72 See William Schabas, Death Penalty in International Law (3rd ed., Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002) 257–258.
73 Ibid., 258.
74 fdre Criminal Code, Article 119.
were carried out in Ethiopia since 1991.68 There have since been no reported in-
stances of execution.
One may, of course, read a political motive into the enforcement of death 
sentences in Ethiopia. The three executions carried out were against prisoners 
convicted of committing offences in which the victims were top-ranking mili-
tary or government (Ethiopian or foreign) officials.69 However, it may not mean 
that the death penalty has been abolished for non-political crimes. The reason 
behind the rarity of the enforcement of death sentences is far from clear. The 
required relevant information is inaccessible; which may relate, according to 
Amnesty International, to a general lack of government transparency.70
Evidently, there is no indication that Ethiopia intends to abolish the death 
penalty in practice. It is among the countries that have consistently voted 
against un General Assembly resolutions on a moratorium on the use of the 
death penalty.71 Furthermore, in a more direct encounter with core crimes, 
that is, at the Rome Diplomatic Conference held from 15 June to 17 July 1998 
to draft the Rome Statute of the icc, Ethiopia expressed its preference to keep 
the death penalty.72 It also endorsed the view that the ‘death penalty is not a 
human rights issue’.73
Once approved by the President, the death sentence should be enforced 
forthwith, except when the law requires the suspension of the execution owing 
to full or partial irresponsibility, serious illness, or the pregnancy of the person 
awaiting execution.74 Nevertheless, there is no time frame in which the Presi-
dent shall exercise her or his prerogative to approve the enforcement of the 
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death sentence. As the President’s silence does not amount to a disapproval of 
the death sentence, there is nothing in the law that guarantees the release or 
commutation of a sentence of a prisoner awaiting execution in cases when the 
President does not consent to execution.
A person condemned to death is required to await execution in prison un-
der the same conditions as a prisoner serving rigorous imprisonment.75 Ar-
ticle 224 of the Criminal Code provides that the prisoner may remain on death 
row for as long as 30 years – the expiry of which renders the death sentence 
unenforceable. This is no doubt a very long period to endure, to borrow the 
ECtHR’s expression in Soering, ‘the anguish and mounting tension of living in 
the ever-present shadow of death.’76 Given that the conditions of confinement 
in Ethiopia exhibit the presence of the death row phenomenon,77 the law and 
practice may raise concerns regarding the existence of inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment of prisoners awaiting executions.
Interestingly, the death penalty in Ethiopia cannot be imposed: (i) in rela-
tion to attempted crimes, (ii) on criminals below 18 years of age, and (iii) if 
there is a mitigating factor.78 In respect of the third element, the fhc under-
scored in Mengistu et al. that ‘the availability of multiple aggravating factors 
is not per se sufficient to impose the death penalty unless the court ascertains 
the absence of a mitigating factor’.79 Nonetheless, this requirement of the law 
is seldom upheld in practice.80
4 Sentencing Rationales
The absence of clear guidance in relation to sentencing rationales in the found-
ing documents of the unicts and the icc, which has been considered one 
of the challenges in international sentencing practice, is, to a certain degree, 
not a problem in the Ethiopian legal system. Article 1 of the Criminal Code 
lays down the goals of the criminal law and the rationales of punishment.81 
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Nonetheless, as all available rationales of sentencing are meant to apply to all 
types of crimes, it is therefore up to a particular court to choose and apply 
the rationale it deems appropriate to punish core crimes. In practice, however, 
the Ethiopian courts do not do more than recite in general terms the ratio-
nales available in the law, as shown below. This is also the case in international 
 sentencing practice where courts often do not detail the impact a particular 
sentencing rationale has on the calculation of the actual sentence.82
The 1957 Penal Code was both utilitarian and retributivist in its sentencing 
rationales. It aimed at ‘providing for…the reform of offenders and measures to 
prevent the commission of further crimes’, and was, therefore, utilitarian in 
purpose.83 In referring to retribution, the code stated its aim as ‘providing for 
the punishment of offenders’.84 The Criminal Code however appears to have 
implicitly excluded the latter by confining the aims of punishment to deter-
rence (specific and general), rehabilitation and incapacitation.85
Ethiopian courts appear to have rejected retribution even before its official 
exclusion by the Criminal Code. It was not invoked as a rationale even in the 
Dergue and the Anuak-Nuwer cases where sentences were pronounced on the 
basis of the Penal Code. This makes Ethiopian practice stand in marked con-
trast to the way the unicts and the icc have invoked sentencing rationales, in 
which retribution has been regarded as the principal purpose of punishment.86
What makes the sentencing approach followed by Ethiopian courts differ-
ent, if not problematic, is not just the exclusion of retribution, but that it was 
excluded because it might have been seen as equivalent to vengeance. Some 
courts appeared to have based their sentencing decisions on a retributive ra-
tionale using expressions such as ‘an offender should be punished because he 
broke the law’.87 Nonetheless, they often fail to drive the argument home for an 
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apparent fear that such reasoning could easily be associated with or mistaken 
for an expression of vengeance.88
Given that both the defendants and commentators have widely accused the 
Dergue trials of exercising victor’s justice and vengeance, it is understandable 
that the courts might have wanted to send a positive message as to the im-
partiality of the proceedings. Arguably, that is partly why in Mengistu et al., 
the fhc rejected the death penalty by stating that ‘in the given circumstances 
imposing the death penalty serves no purpose other than vengeance’.89 None-
theless, while disavowing vengeance as the purpose of punishment is one 
thing, emphasizing the fact that retribution is not an expression of vengeance 
is another. That is apparently what the unicts and the icc have been doing 
by persistently reiterating a disclaimer that retribution as a purpose of punish-
ment is not an expression of vengeance, but an expression of the international 
community’s condemnation of core crimes.90
Concerning deterrence (specific or general), Ethiopian courts have re-
cited the Criminal Code’s statement that ‘punishment can deter wrongdoers 
from committing other crimes; it can also serve as a warning to prospective 
 wrongdoers’.91 Several courts have however attached a significant amount 
of emphasis to the importance of specific deterrence.92 The unicts have, 
by  contrast, treated specific deterrence as a less important sentencing ratio-
nale, because the commission of core crimes is seen as dependent upon the 
 existence of a political context that goes well beyond the will of any particular 
individual.93 Despite the courts’ insistence on specific deterrence, this con-
text was also true in Ethiopia — core crimes could not have been committed 
without the participation of a large number of people in orchestrating and 
implementing state and organizational plan or policy.94 Such a reality renders 
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recidivism less likely. This should have been reflected in the sentencing by pay-
ing more emphasis to general deterrence and less to specific deterrence.
As for rehabilitation, to which the law claims to be paying greater attention 
than any of its other aims,95 case-law has often mentioned it without explana-
tion and always together with other purposes of punishment such as general 
and specific deterrence. As such, the role it played in determining and justi-
fying specific sentences is not very clear. Due to this lack of transparency in 
sentencing, it is difficult to compare and contrast Ethiopian practice with its 
international counterparts, where rehabilitation is regarded as playing a mar-
ginal role, given the gravity of core crimes.96
Lastly, it is noteworthy that some courts have justified punishment using 
rationales that are not listed in the statutory law, namely ‘healing victims’ 
wounds’,97 ‘preparing perpetrators for reconciliation’,98 and ‘ensuring respect 
for the human rights of life and liberty’.99 Likewise, the unicts have created 
justifications such as ‘reconciliation’ which do not belong to the traditional 
sentencing rationales.100 In both systems, however, the new rationales do not 
appear to have served more than a nominal purpose. As for the Ethiopian 
courts, however, this practice of creating new rationales is unwarranted, be-
cause the law does not give judges the discretion to do so.
5 Factors in Sentence Determination: Aggravation and Mitigation
The determination of the appropriate penalty under Ethiopian law depends 
on the analysis of: 1. the gravity of the crime and the circumstances of its com-
mission, and 2. the degree of individual guilt.101 As shall be seen, courts need to 
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distinguish between the two factors and treat them separately to avoid double-
counting, i.e. using the same aggravating or mitigating factor twice.102
5.1 Gravity of the Crime and the Circumstances of its Commission: The 
Initial Penalty
As discussed above in section 2, Ethiopian law prescribed the minimum and 
maximum penalties for each of the acts it proscribes based on whether they 
are minor, not serious, grave, or extremely grave. As such, it is within the power 
of the legislator, not the courts, to make a general determination as to whether 
a particular crime is graver than other crimes. In other words, there is no ju-
dicial comparison in Ethiopia as to whether, for instance, genocide is graver 
than war crimes, or even whether a core crime is more severe than domestic 
crimes.
This does not mean that courts do not determine the gravity of the specific 
offence under consideration for sentencing. In fact, a court has to determine 
the gravity of any particular crime for which the defendant is found guilty. 
Doing so is a prerequisite for the specification of the initial penalty, i.e. the 
specific penalty the court has to indicate by choosing from the minimum and 
 maximum sentences set by the law. This has to be specified at the beginning 
of the sentencing stage as it serves as a preliminary or ‘hypothetical’103 penalty 
upon which the court bases itself to calculate mitigating or aggravating factors 
and pronounce the final sentence. The court’s choice of the initial penalty usu-
ally depends on its assessment of the gravity of the crime committed that it has 
to establish from the circumstances of its commission.104
In reality, the circumstances of the commission of a crime could also 
 constitute aggravating or mitigating factors,105 which are to be taken into 
consideration after the initial penalty has been determined.106 The many sen-
tencing judgments analysed in this study indicate that, except, notably, in the 
war crimes case,107 Ethiopian courts have not specified in their sentencing 
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judgments the gravity they attached to a particular crime and the initial pen-
alty they have chosen. As a result, it could be difficult to verify whether a 
specific sentencing judgment has involved double-counting by applying the 
same  circumstances of commission to determine the gravity of the crime and 
to aggravate or mitigate the initial penalty.108
In contrast, as the international practice is more transparent, it avoids the 
occurrence of double-counting. In Lubanga, the icc declined to consider 
the age of the children (Lubanga’s victims) as an aggravating factor in order 
not to commit double aggravation.109 It is also an established practice of the 
unicts that double-counting if found to be significant, warrants reduction or 
addition of sentence by the Appeals Chamber.110 Most importantly, to avoid 
 double-counting, the unicts’ Trial Chambers shall ‘consider and count all as-
pects and implications’ of a sentencing factor it applied.111
A sentencing judgment’s opacity has a different magnitude and effect in 
Ethiopia, as it became irremediable even on appeal. Firstly, as it is too diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to indicate specific grounds of appeal from an opaque 
judgment, most of the sentencing appeals carry a brief but general claim 
that a given sentence is unfair, i.e. too severe or too lenient.112 Secondly, this 
reality has, apparently, forced the fsc (the Court of Appeal) to unconvention-
ally approach sentencing appeals by framing the issue as broadly as ‘whether 
the sentence imposed appears unfair in the eyes of the law’.113 This has, ulti-
mately,  resulted in the appeals process being virtually a trial de novo, which 
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has no basis in Ethiopian law.114 This is also the case in the jurisprudence of 
the unicts.115
Ironically, the fsc has not done justice to the opacity problem. The appeal 
judgments are as opaque as those of the trial courts. In particular, the fsc does 
not examine or criticize the lower courts’ failure to specify the initial penal-
ty. Rather, it focuses on superficial and enigmatic assessments of sentencing 
 factors, and, often, abruptly concludes that ‘the sentence imposed does not 
appear to be too severe or too lenient’ or that ‘there is no ground to examine 
the trial court’s sentencing judgment’.116
5.2 The Degree of Individual Guilt: Mitigating and Aggravating the 
Initial Penalty
In invoking the degree of individual guilt as a sentencing factor, Ethiopian 
courts may rely on, inter alia, the criminal’s dangerous disposition, anteced-
ents, motives, purpose, personal circumstances, and standard of education.117 
These factors fall within the ambit of mitigating or aggravating circumstanc-
es.118 There are a complex set of rules that govern aggravation and mitigation 
and delineate the judge’s discretion in sentencing.
Similar to its international counterparts, Ethiopian criminal law recognizes 
two types of aggravating and mitigating factors: statutory (listed in the Code) 
and judicial (judge-made).119 Ethiopian law further divides the statutory ag-
gravating and mitigating factors into two: general and special.120 General miti-
gating or aggravating factors imply ordinary mitigation or aggravation, that is, 
mitigation or aggravation within, respectively, the minimum and maximum 
bounds of the penalty specific to the crime under consideration.121 Special 
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mitigating and aggravating factors have a special effect—the so-called free 
mitigation or free aggravation. This special effect implies the power to go be-
yond the minimum or the maximum limits of the penalty for a specific crime 
and impose a sentence as low as the general minimum rigorous imprisonment 
(1 year) or as high as the general maximum rigorous imprisonment (25 years).122
Interestingly, there is no difference in weight among general aggravating or 
mitigating factors, be it statutory or judicial; each of them carries equal weight. 
Accordingly, it is not within the discretion of the court to attach less weight to 
one sentencing factor and more to another, unlike the case of the unicts and 
the icc.123 The only difference of significance among the sentencing factors is 
the one that exists between the general and special ones.
5.2.1 Special Mitigating Factors
Generally, the special mitigating factors that justify free mitigation are family 
and affectionate relationships.124 Apparently, this provision is a continuation 
of the 1930 Penal Code’s approach adopted to give effect to the traditionally 
strong family relationships in Ethiopia.125 Besides, factors that fall short of ex-
culpating criminal responsibility may instead qualify as special mitigating fac-
tors upon express stipulation in the law to that effect.126
Of the three instances of core crime trials in Ethiopia, only the Dergue trials 
have applied free mitigation to punish génocidaires with sentences below the 
minimum limit of 5 years of rigorous imprisonment. This was particularly the 
case in Mekonnen Gelan et al., which imposed 2 and 4 years of rigorous impris-
onment on, respectively, 14 and 9 defendants found guilty of genocide.127 To 
justify these sentences, the court invoked: (i) the young age of the defendants 
at the time of the commission of the crime (defendants being high school stu-
dents), (ii) lack of education (defendants being peasants), and (iii) the ‘prevail-
ing circumstances of the time’, i.e. that there was a power struggle between the 
Dergue and the victims (opposition political groups), and the heinous crimes 
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were committed as a response to the multi-sided and intricate violence of the 
time.128
Nonetheless, the application of free mitigation in Mekonnen Gelan et al. is 
tricky. It was not only devoid of sufficient explanation but also relied on judi-
cial mitigating factors to justify free mitigation.129 This is erroneous since ju-
dicial mitigating factors cannot be regarded as special mitigating factors, and, 
thus, do not apply in free mitigation.130
5.2.2 General Mitigating Factors
There are five general statutory mitigating factors in Ethiopian law: good 
 character; acting with honourable and disinterested motive; justified fear 
(including obedience to superior orders); expression of sincere remorse; 
and provocation or mental distress.131 These factors are also available in the 
 practice of the unicts and the icc.132 In addition to applying the statutory 
mitigating factors, Ethiopian courts have exercised their broad discretion to 
invoke numerous grounds of mitigation.
In what signifies the most controversial example of the use of mitigating 
factors, the majority in Mengistu et al. pronounced a life sentence instead of 
the death penalty after identifying eight grounds of mitigation.133 These were: 
(i) the prevailing circumstances of the time of the commission, (ii) lack of edu-
cation, (iii) old age, (iv) age-related sickness, (v) lengthy trial, (vi) contribution 
to the defence of the country and international peacekeeping missions, (vii) 
reform during detention, and (viii) signs of remorse and reconciliation.134
On appeal, the fsc indefensibly rejected all of the fhc’s mitigating factors 
and aggravated 18 life sentences to death sentences.135 Firstly, the reasons that 
the fsc put forward to reject the fhc’s mitigating factors are too brief to be 
convincing, except for the eighth factor, in which it stated that the mere sign 
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of remorse is not sufficient to mitigate a sentence.136 Furthermore, in rejecting 
the fhc’s mitigating factors, the fsc runs into a contradiction not only with 
judgments of several other courts but also with its own decisions in compa-
rable cases.137 For instance, unlike its conclusion in this case that ‘being of old 
age and a victim of age associated-diseases is by no measurement a mitigat-
ing ground’,138 the fsc has argued oppositely in Tiruneh Habteselassie v. spo, 
where it mitigated a death sentence to life imprisonment on the sole basis of 
the appellant’s sickness.139
Secondly, the fsc has unwarrantedly intervened with the trial court’s broad 
discretion to create as many judicial mitigating factors as it may deem nec-
essary. In this respect, it should be noted that Ethiopian trial judges enjoy a 
comparable degree of ‘unfettered discretion’ with that of international judges, 
in particular as far as creating (not applying) mitigating or aggravating factors 
are concerned.140 Nevertheless, in revising the fhc’s sentencing judgment, 
the fsc did not show if the fhc had exercised its discretion to create judi-
cial mitigating factors beyond what is permitted by law. As a result, the fsc’s 
judgment amounts to unwarranted intervention with the discretion of the trial 
court.141 Such an exercise of appellate power is also not possible in interna-
tional practice.142
It also appears from practice that Ethiopian courts have shown an implicit 
tendency to relegate mitigating factors, in particular when aggravating factors 
have an overwhelming presence. Arguably, that is what happened in the fsc’s 
sentencing decision in Mengistu et al., where the court emphasized the gravity 
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of the crimes and the extreme dangerousness of the convicts in order to im-
pose the death penalty. Similarly, the fhc overlooked mitigating factors in Ge-
tachew Tek’eba (the first of the spo cases to pronounce the death penalty),143 
Abdulkadir Mohammed Burka,144 Gesgese Gebremeskel et al.,145 Tesfaye Wolde-
selassie et al.,146 and Zenebe Ayele et al.147
The view that considers an aggravating factor capable of rendering a miti-
gating factor insignificant, if not inapplicable, finds support in international 
sentencing practice. For instance, the icty Appeals Chamber in Popović et al. 
stated in relation to the imposition of a life sentence, that, ‘the existence of 
mitigating circumstances does not automatically result in a reduction of sen-
tence or preclude the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment where the 
gravity of the offence so requires’.148
In reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber in Popović relied on ap-
peal judgments of the ictr in Nizeyimana,149 Ntabakuze,150 and Niyitegeka,151 
and thereby presented the point as an established practice of the unicts. 
Similarly, as noted in Blaškic et al. in connection to the defendant’s position 
of power, an aggravating factor may either significantly increase the sen-
tence or ‘at least lead the Trial Chamber to give less weight to the mitigating 
circumstances’.152
Nonetheless, the law in Ethiopia is unequivocally different in the sense that 
neither a multiplicity nor the perceived weightiness of aggravating factors af-
fects the application of mitigating factors. In fact, a single mitigating factor 
should result in an automatic reduction of a sentence, including the ultimate 
penalty. There should be a mandatory assessment of both aggravating and 
mitigating factors. Moreover, the courts should first aggravate the penalty on 
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the basis of any aggravating factors and then mitigate the sentence by applying 
mitigating factors.153 The crux of the matter is that there is a rule of separate 
treatment of mitigation and aggravation; and, as Philip Graven put it, the fac-
tors ‘do not exclude each other’.154
5.2.3 Special Aggravating Factors
The special aggravating factors that engender free aggravation are in general 
concurrence of crimes and recidivism.155 The concurrence of crimes is the only 
special aggravating factor that has been used in Ethiopian trials of core crimes. 
It occurs when a person commits two or more successive crimes; when the 
same criminal act simultaneously contravenes several criminal provisions; or 
when the commission of a single crime harms the interests of more than one 
person.156 The vast majority of the Dergue trials and the Oromo-Gumuz trials 
used a multiplicity of convictions as special aggravating factors. Defendants 
were found to have committed a domestic crime (murder, grave bodily injury 
or rape) in addition to a core crime (genocide or war crimes). No single defen-
dant was found guilty of both genocide and war crimes at the same time by the 
same court.
Pronouncing multiple sentences on a single criminal found guilty of mul-
tiple offences is not permissible under Ethiopian law. The court may deter-
mine separate sentences for each of the concurrent crimes knowing that at 
the end they would become a single sentence either by way of absorption or 
addition.157 The absorption rule applies to death sentences and life sentenc-
es. Once the death sentence is determined for one of the concurrent crimes, 
it may be taken as final for it absorbs any other penalty the court might im-
pose for the other crimes. The same rule applies where the maximum penalty 
imposed for one of the concurrent crimes is a life sentence.158 The addition 
rule works with sentences of fixed prison terms. Accordingly, the court may 
add sentences imposed for each of the concurrent crimes and determine the 
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161 On the application of absorption or addition in such cases, see Mekonnen Welelaw v. Fed-
eral Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Prosecutor, fsc Cassation Bench (Judgment 
of 26 June 2014), File no. 96503, pp. 2–4.
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es’, 4(1) Journal of Human Remains and Violence (2018) 86–87.
final sentence, without exceeding the general maximum, 25 years of rigorous 
imprisonment.159
Accordingly, Ethiopian law provides for a mandatory single sentence for 
multiple convictions. In that, it differs from the case of the unicts, where a 
trial chamber enjoys the discretion to impose a single penalty when the ac-
cused has been found guilty of multiple crimes that are linked together.160 
Further, the existence of a single sentence rule in Ethiopia renders irrelevant 
issues that international practice deals with, namely consecutive or simulta-
neous enforcement of multiple sentences. The absorption and addition rules 
apply even to sentences passed on the same individual by different courts and 
at different times, as is the case with respect to defendants in the Dergue trials 
such as Melaku Teferra, Eshetu Alemu, Kebede Kiberet, Getachew Tekebe, and 
Legesse Asfaw.161
5.2.4 General Aggravating Factors
Similar to the number of general statutory mitigating factors, the Criminal 
Code identifies five general statutory aggravating factors, namely reprehen-
sible  motives, abuse of a position of power, the vulnerability of victims,  vicious 
circumstances of the commission and participation in a criminal agree-
ment.162 International practice has also taken similar factors of aggravation 
into account.163 Vicious circumstances of the commission and the abuse of 
a position of power have stood out in Ethiopian trials as justifying the most 
severe penalties.
In condemning convicts to death, the Dergue trials relied on the existence 
of vicious circumstances surrounding the commission of crimes such as vio-
lence against the dead, in which the dead were denied a proper burial, hauled 
across or dumped on the streets, thrown into mass graves or abysses, and 
fed to beasts.164 The Oromo-Gumuz trials have followed a similar approach in 
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no. 1310, p. 7.
171 Aman Gobena et al., supra note 46, pp. 7–9.
172 See Prosecutor v. Milan Babić, icty (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal of 18 July 2005), it-
03–72-a, para. 80; Emmanuel Ndinddabahizi v. Prosecutor, ictr (Appeal Judgment of 16 
relation to convicts who were found to have eaten the organs (kidneys and liv-
ers), drunk the blood, and butchered the genitals and elbows of their victims 
as a sign of superiority and victory.165 Likewise, the unicts have also noted 
that vicious circumstances of the commission constitute ‘a decisive aggravat-
ing circumstance’.166
In pronouncing 18 death sentences in Mengistu et al., the fsc highlighted 
the abuse of a position of power in the sense that the defendants were mem-
bers of the Dergue’s Standing Committee, the regime’s highest executive or-
gan.167 A closer look at practice reveals that being the highest ranking or a 
 low-ranking officer in the general military hierarchy or civilian structure did 
not make a difference for the assessment of the abuse of a position of power. 
It operated on the assumption that as any position of authority carries with it 
a duty to serve and protect others, the criminal must be subjected to a harsher 
sentence as long as he or she had a position of authority at the time of the com-
mission of the crime.168
Nonetheless, the assumption can be set aside if it is shown that the per-
petrator did not abuse her or his position of power. Judges may disregard the 
position of authority and instead mitigate the sentence on grounds such as 
obedience to a superior order, as was done by the fsc in Teshome Kebede et al.,169 
and by Amhara Supreme Court (asc) in Demetse Gebremedehen et al.170 Inter-
estingly, according to the judgment of Oromia Supreme Court (osc) in Teshome 
Gobenea et al., even a regional governor can successfully invoke obedience to 
superior order (justified fear) as a mitigating factor.171 In this regard, Ethiopian 
practice appears to be more or less similar to the practice of the unicts and 
the icc where the emphasis is not per se on a position of authority but on the 
abuse of that position.172
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non’, in Amal Alamuddin et al. (eds.), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Law and Practice 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 232–238; William Schabas, ‘In Absentia Proceed-
ings before International Criminal Courts’, in Göran Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (eds.), In-
ternational Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law (Cameron May, London, 
2009) pp. 336–342.
175 See Criminal Procedure Code, Article 161.
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177 See Legesse Asfaw et al., supra note 104, p. 7.
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An aggravating factor typical to the Ethiopian core crimes trials is the ac-
cused being an absconder.173 This has not been regarded as a ground of ag-
gravation in international trials due to the unacceptability of trial in absentia 
before the unicts and the icc.174 Even in Ethiopia, where trial in absentia 
is allowed as a last resort proceeding in relation to crimes punishable with 
rigorous imprisonment of 12 years and above,175 the sentencing law does 
not discriminate against a fugitive offender. Its qualification as an aggravat-
ing factor is, therefore, a result of judicial consideration which seems to have 
been prompted by the need to respond to the unprecedented proliferation 
of  absence in the Dergue trials. Having tried 2188 of 5119 defendants in their 
 absence, these trials have evidently struggled with the absence of defendants, 
perhaps, like no other trial of international crimes in history.176 As also noted 
in the war crimes case, in which presence at trial was regarded as a mitigating 
factor, judges opined that from the perspective of proportionality of punish-
ment it would be unfair to punish the present and the absent alike.177
Notably, aggravation or mitigation of sentences on account of situation-
specific factors is not unique to the Ethiopian trials. Similarly, the unicts have 
taken into account factors that have particular relevance to the situation in 
which they have been operating. For instance, voluntary surrender has been 
regarded by the icty as a mitigating factor owing to the challenges the tribunal 
had faced in relation to State cooperation.178
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6 Multiplicity of Convicts and the Problem of Individualization of 
Punishment
As noted at the outset of this article, core crimes trials in Ethiopia have been 
mass trials, with the exception of the Anuak-Nuwer trials where there were 
only 9 defendants. In the Dergue cases 5119 defendants were tried, while 276 
defendants stood trial in the Oromo-Gumuz cases. Perhaps no other core 
crimes trial in history has prosecuted a comparable number of defendants as 
those prosecuted in Ethiopia, except for the case of Rwandan national courts 
and the Gacaca courts for genocide-related cases.179 The icty and ictr have 
tried and punished, respectively, 90 and 62 individuals.180 The icc has, so far, 
convicted only 7 defendants.181
Most importantly, there was rarely a trial of a single defendant in Ethio-
pia’s core crime cases. The main genocide trial, Mengistu et al., had, initially, 
106 co-defendants while 23 defendants stood trial in the war crimes case. Me-
konnen Gelan et al. stands out as the single trial with the highest number of 
 co- defendants, that is, 237. In the Oromo Gumuz trials, Tadesse Jewannie et al. 
and Aliyu Yesufe et al. had, respectively, 137 and 127 co-defendants.
The multiplicity of defendants, at times, created issues concerning the ac-
cused’s right to defend oneself. In Mengistu et al., the fhc rejected the defen-
dants’ preliminary objection requesting a separate trial and asserted that the 
joinder of the defendants was justified as the manner of the commission of 
the crime involved all of them.182 The ultimate effect of the multiplicity of de-
fendants was felt at the sentencing stage. Here, it tested the judges’ willingness 
and ability to uphold the Criminal Code’s principle of individualization of sen-
tence and non-transmissibility of personal circumstances (Article 41) as well as 
the totality principle (Article 88(2)).
Several sentencing judgments failed to individualize the penalty by at-
tributing personal circumstances collectively to several defendants. In Men-
gistu et al., for instance, mitigating factors such as illness, old age, service in 
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peacekeeping missions, were applied collectively to all defendants.183 In Me-
konnen Gelan et al., several defendants were sentenced to identical penalties 
because they were either young students or uneducated peasants.184 In these 
and several other cases, the courts neither considered the personal circum-
stances of the defendants separately nor discussed the level of participation 
of each convict.
In other cases, personal circumstances were ignored altogether as sentenc-
ing judgments were limited to mentioning just the gravity of the crime, albeit 
that they do not even explicitly state its actual gravity and its implication for 
the determination of sentence, as discussed above.185 In Aliyu Yesufe et al., 17 
convicts were condemned collectively to 15 years of rigorous imprisonment on 
the ground that they participated in the killing of 4 individuals.186 In Tadesse 
Jewannie et al., 27 defendants were sentenced to 20 years because, according 
to the court, ‘they killed one person each’.187 In Brigadier General Tedla Desta 
et al., 11 defendants were sentenced to 9 years of rigorous imprisonment based 
on the common ground that they all participated in the unlawful arrest of sev-
eral young persons.188
Notwithstanding, the Ethiopian courts have, like their international coun-
terparts,189 often highlighted the need to individualize sentence and respect 
the totality principle. In that regard, virtually all sentencing judgments in 
 Ethiopia recite that the sentence shall be calculated in compliance with 
Articles 41 and 88 of the Criminal Code. It, thus, appears that there were just 
too many defendants in one trial to treat each of them separately and method-
ically. One might, therefore, need to consider the unique challenge that the 
Ethiopian courts had to deal with while comparing them to the unicts and 
the icc, where not more than, respectively, 7 and 5 defendants were tried in a 
single trial.190
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7 Conclusion
This article has discussed the general and significant rules governing sentenc-
ing determination in Ethiopia in the context of the core crimes of genocide 
and war crimes. It has analysed this law and practice in light of and in compari-
son to the law and practice of the unicts and the icc. It has also discussed the 
punishment of core crimes in comparison with that of domestic crimes, not 
least concerning applicable penalties and sentencing rationales.
The article has revealed the absence in Ethiopian law of a penalty scheme 
that takes into account the nature and gravity of core crimes, because of which 
some domestic crimes are punishable, paradoxically, more severely than core 
crimes. It has also pointed out several differences in the applicable penalties 
available to Ethiopian law, the unicts, and the icc. The applicability of the 
death penalty in Ethiopia represents the most significant difference. Some of 
the differences are understandable in the sense that municipal laws (including 
those of states parties to the icc) are not required to apply international pen-
alties,191 although international law strives to minimise the difference by em-
ploying approaches such as the progressive abolition of the death penalty.192
According to this article’s findings, nowhere in their judgments have the 
Ethiopian courts explained and analysed the sentencing rationales they in-
voked. While the unicts and the icc have attempted to justify the punish-
ment of core crimes by giving due regard to their distinct nature, Ethiopian 
courts, by contrast, have employed sentencing rationales in a manner that is 
typical to the punishment of domestic crimes. This deficit may find an expla-
nation in the fact that Ethiopian judges lack expertise in the evolving field of 
international criminal law, a problem that has been identified as one of the 
shortcomings of national prosecutions of core crimes in general.193
The article has found that both Ethiopian and international sentencing 
practices lack transparency. To a certain degree, the exercise of broad judicial 
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discretion by both international and domestic courts has contributed to the 
lack of transparency in sentencing. However, the opacity of Ethiopian sen-
tencing judgments has created further difficulties for verifying double count-
ing  errors. As shown in this article, the difference in the scope of discretion 
between international and Ethiopian judges explains most of the differences 
between the two sentencing systems, in particular with regards to the applica-
tion of aggravating and mitigating factors. Nonetheless, there are also cases 
in which Ethiopian courts have imposed more severe or lenient penalties by 
misapplying aggravating and mitigating factors.
Finally, this article has shown that there is in principle no noticeable dif-
ference between the Ethiopian and the international system as to the need 
to individualize sentences and comply with the totality principle. Ethiopian 
practice is however significantly deficient in this regard. This could be be-
cause Ethiopian courts had to deal with the unique challenge of punishing an 
 unmanageable number of defendants in a single trial.
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